Dinâmicas geopolíticas e a cadeia de valor dos microchips
Navegando a rivalidade entre Estados Unidos e China
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.69895/g2dav916Palavras-chave:
China, Estados Unidos, Taiwán, microchips, competição tecnológica, cadeias globais de valorResumo
Este artigo examina a intensificação da rivalidade estratégica entre os Estados Unidos e a China a partir da perspectiva da economia política internacional e da geoeconomia, com foco no setor de semicondutores como um campo crítico de competição tecnológica e geopolítica. Integrando contribuições sobre poder estrutural, interdependência armada e governança das cadeias globais de valor, o estudo analisa como a transição da guerra comercial (2018) para uma guerra tecnológica abrangente reconfigurou as estratégias estatais, as dependências das cadeias de suprimentos e os padrões de política industrial. Atenção especial é dada a Taiwan, cuja dominância na fabricação avançada de microchips aumenta simultaneamente seu valor estratégico e expõe vulnerabilidades sistêmicas no ecossistema global de semicondutores. Combina-se análise de políticas, dados de comércio e medidas regulatórias para avaliar como controles de exportação, subsídios e a construção de alianças remodelaram o panorama competitivo. São realizadas análises de Fortalezas, Oportunidades, Fraquezas e Ameaças para avaliar a indústria sob condições de crescente tensão geopolítica. Os resultados mostram que, apesar dos esforços de desacoplamento, EUA e China permanecem interligados por densas interdependências tecnológicas e produtivas, reforçando dilemas estratégicos para governos e empresas.
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Copyright (c) 2025 Ignacio Bartesaghi, Natalia Melgar (Author)

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