Alignment statecraft and alignment dilemma:The causes of hedging under US-China competitionin Latin America’s digital infrastructure

Joaquin Maquieira-Alonzo; Cuihong Cai; Brice Tseen Fu Lee

doi:10.69895/yj5yv823

Authors

Joaquin Maquieira-Alonzo Fudan University Author https://orcid.org/0009-0009-5796-2562
Cuihong Cai Fudan University Author https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8221-0244
Brice Tseen Fu Lee Fudan University Author https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9763-0700

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.69895/yj5yv823

Keywords:

Weaponized Interdependence , Balance of Threat, Great Power Rivalry , 5G, Data Centers, International Political Economy

Abstract

What compels states to show explicit alignment strategies during great power competition? Building on the balance of threat theory and hedging literature, we argue the primary trigger is not the rise of a great power or rivalry itself, but Negative Alignment Statecraft (NAS): the use of economic or security coercion by a great power to limit a third state’s engagement with its rival. We contend that NAS creates an Alignment Dilemma and forces targeted states to clarify their positions. To test this, we conduct a comparative analysis of two sectors in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico with growing Chinese presence: 5G/4G antennas and data centers. Where NAS was present, the countries explicitly hedged. Where it was not, hedging—if it existed—remained passive or hidden. Our findings contribute to ongoing debates about the causes of hedging by specifying a mechanism that pushes states toward active alignment strategies. But this raises a further problem we term Schrödinger’s Alignment: a condition in which it is analytically unclear whether a state is pursuing a hidden alignment strategy or no strategy at all.

Author Biographies

Joaquin Maquieira-Alonzo, Fudan University

Joaquín Maquieira Alonzo is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Fudan University (Shanghai, China), where he researches the geopolitics of the semiconductor value chain, with a focus on the competition between the United States and China and its implications for International Political Economy (IPE). He holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from UdelaR (thesis on digital platforms and IPE), a Diploma in Internet Governance from Universidad de San Andrés and UFRGS, and a Master’s degree in International Relations from FLACSO Argentina (thesis on cloud computing and IPE). In 2023 and 2024 he co-designed and was Professor of the course Analysis of Digital Platforms at the Catholic University of Uruguay.
Cuihong Cai, Fudan University

Dr. Cuihong Cai is Professor of International Relations at the Center for American Studies of Fudan University. She received her B.S. (1993) and M.S. (1996) in biophysics, and her Ph.D. (2002) in International Relations from Fudan University. She is the author of Cyber Governance in China: Balancing State Centrism and Collaborative Dynamics (London & New York: Routledge, 2025); Cyber Politics in U.S.-China Relations (Singapore: World Scientific, 2021; Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2019), Political Development in the Cyber Age (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2015), U.S. National Information Security Strategy (Shanghai: Academia Press, 2009）and Internet and International Politics (Shanghai: Academia Press, 2003), as well as over a hundred articles and papers on cyber politics, cybersecurity strategy, cyberspace governance and Sino-US relations.
Brice Tseen Fu Lee, Fudan University

Brice Tseen Fu Lee is a Senior Researcher from Universidad del Desarrollo at the Center of International Relations Studies. He holds a PhD in International Politics from Fudan University, an MA in Politics, Governance and Public Policy from the University of Sheffield as a Chevening Scholar, an MSc in Management and Technology from Universiti Teknologi Brunei, and a BA in Business Administration from Universiti Brunei Darussalam.

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Alignment statecraft and alignment dilemma:The causes of hedging under US-China competitionin Latin America’s digital infrastructure

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